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A March Made in Georgia: Sherman’s Famous March to the Sea

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Today, we are pleased to welcome guest author Derek Maxfield.

One hundred-fifty years ago this fall, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman led an army of sixty-thousand men on a militarily-unorthodox campaign through the heart of Georgia.  Sherman’s “March to the Sea”, as it has come to be known, began with the utter destruction of Atlanta as a railroad hub and seat of manufacturing – and ended with the capture of Savannah just before Christmas, 1864.

I have always been intrigued by Sherman, and especially this episode of his career.  To Civil Warriors, Sherman is a familiar figure: rail-thin and fidgety, with a shock of red hair on top and a close-cropped beard and mustache, he was a blue-clad Energizer bunny with a cigar.  With a tendency toward the manic, the general made many people nervous.  It was this quality, combined with some spot-on prophetic utterings, which had some saying that Sherman was insane early in the war.  But, as I have come to discover, there is much more to the man.  Sherman, a member of Grant’s staff once noted, had “a peculiar energy of manner in uttering the crisp words and epigrammatic phrases which fell from his lips as rapidly as shots from a magazine-gun.  I soon realized he was one of the most dramatic and picturesque characters of the war” (Marszalek 289).

From an early age, people that knew “Cump” understood he was very intelligent and a quick-study.  These qualities were appreciated by Thomas Ewing, Sherman’s adopted Father (and later Father-in-Law), who decided to secure an appointment to West Point for the boy.  Sherman’s near-photographic memory not only helped him through his studies, but would later pay in spades during the Atlanta Campaign.  In his pre-Civil War army career, Sherman rode the back-roads of Northern Georgia in his spare hours studying the terrain.  Seemingly little more than a diversion at the time, when he matched wits with Confederate General Joe Johnston during the Atlanta Campaign, he was able to draw on those memories of the terrain to find ways around Johnston’s flanks.

The “March” is a product of Sherman’s intelligence, memory, and evolving understanding of the nature of the conflict.  In particular, the seeds of the “March” can be found in the Vicksburg Campaign – especially from the landing at Bruinsburg to the surrender — and the Meridian Campaign.  It is ironic that during the Vicksburg Campaign, it was Sherman that lacked vision and thought that Gen. Grant’s plan to get below Vicksburg on the Mississippi, cross his army from the Louisiana shore, thence marching the army inland to Jackson — all the while subsisting his army on the country — before turning westward again and investing Vicksburg, was doomed to failure.  “I feel,” Sherman wrote at the time, “in its success less confidence than in any similar undertaking of the war.”  Later, as they gazed down on the Walnut Hills above Vicksburg, just before the siege began Sherman admitted to Grant, “Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success.  I never could see the end clearly until now.  But this is a campaign.  This is a success if we never take the town”(Foote 326, 380).

Grant’s plan to take Vicksburg depended upon elements that Sherman would later adopt on the “March”.   The army would travel with only bare essentials; forage for the animals and food for the men would be taken from the country.  The army would be kept moving to prevent the country from being stripped of supplies to sustain them.  Wherever possible, the enemy would be deceived and misled as to specific targets and goals.

Whereas the Vicksburg Campaign was a typical military campaign, insofar as continual battle was concerned, the Meridian Campaign was more like a giant raid.  It was January and February 1864, and Sherman was concerned over what might happen in the Mississippi Valley while his armies were chasing Johnston through Georgia.  He needed to strike some blows that would resonate and intimidate.  He settled on a plan to strike at Meridian, Mississippi, a vital railroad hub that hosted storage and distribution facilities, and Selma, Alabama, home to cannon foundries and other manufacturing facilities.

The campaign was remarkable for its ambition on the one hand, and logistics on the other.  Sherman insisted that the army travel light – very light: no tents or baggage – not even for himself or his Corps commanders.  For supplies, only a twenty day supply of hard tack, salt, coffee, ammunition, and medical stores would come along.

The Meridian Campaign was only partly successful, with Selma escaping altogether.  There was virtually no fighting – and no pitched battles.  The one Confederate force that might have engaged Sherman was Gen. Polk’s command of green troops at Demopolis, Alabama – which faded from contact after removing as many stores as possible from the warehouses in Meridian.  Even so, over twelve million dollars in damage was done in Meridian – essentially removing it as a factor in the war.  This campaign was, in many ways, a trial run of Sherman’s later March to the Sea.  The aim was the destruction of the materials of war and the intimidation of the population.  This was a psychological game and a vital piece in Sherman’s evolving total war strategy.

It is hard to say when Sherman first conceived of the “March.”  Preeminently a practical man, it would have been after Atlanta was secured.  More likely, it probably was a product of the turn-of-tables problem with Gen. Hood.  After the capture of Atlanta, now it was Sherman that was holding a place and Hood free to maneuver.  Little infuriated Sherman more than the necessity of chasing Hood’s army back up the very route that he had taken chasing Johnston down.  At any rate, this was when Sherman appealed to Grant for permission to strike out for the coast.

I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah.  Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people, will cripple their military resources.  By attempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result.  I can make this march, and make Georgia howl! (Sherman 627)

Stripping his command down to only the healthiest, hardiest set of veterans, and sending all stores and much personal property to Nashville, Sherman prepared to march into history.  On November 12th, 1864, the lines of communication were broken with the north.  Dividing his army into two wings, Sherman entrusted Generals Oliver O. Howard and Henry W. Slocum with general operations.  His division of cavalry was placed under the command of Gen. Judson Kilpatrick.  Although this trio was far from an inspiring lot, they were solid, competent men who could be counted on to carry out Sherman’s plans.

As the various columns set out on their three-hundred mile adventure, the first stage of the march was designed to feign a movement on Augusta and Macon, with the real target being the state capital at Milledgeville.  Meanwhile, specially chosen bands of foragers were detailed to collect food and forage along the way.  Orders specified that structures were only to be fired on the orders of the corps commanders.  But the reality and the intention as to foraging soon parted ways.  After just a march of a few days the men in column began to bear all kinds of adornments and decorations, some still clucking.

The pillage and plunder committed by Sherman’s men would become the stuff of legend down the years.  Georgians for generations would claim that hordes of blue-coated vultures would show up out of nowhere, strip houses clean of silver, gold watches and treasures of all varieties.  Some would bury their most treasured possessions, or even remove them to what they thought would be places of safety, only to have the practiced Yankees easily discover their attempted ruse.  Women would be pushed aside and treated with contempt – sometimes even raped, though evidence of this claim is scant.

Mostly Sherman shrugged off claims of mistreatment, and any of his troops that were known to go too far were usually punished.  However, Sherman also knew that the tales of brutality struck terror into the hearts of those in his path.  At the time, this worked to his favor.  He made sure that those in the path of his armies knew that if they destroyed food or impeded his march, he would be relentless in punishment.  Whole towns would be burned to the ground and the destruction would be total.

While being chosen to be on a foraging detail was an honor, and carried with it the opportunity for booty and culinary fringe benefits, it was not without danger.  Out on the flanks of the army columns, they were sometimes exposed to the only real military danger along the way – Gen. Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry – that often killed Union foragers on sight.

The Confederate cavalry was the only organized resistance Sherman’s men would encounter through most of their journey to the coast.  To be sure, from the beginning, the Union commander knew that there was little the Confederacy could do to slow his march.  The fact that an army of sixty-thousand Union soldiers could march straight through the heart of a Confederate state virtually unopposed, would be sure to influence the thinking of those still in the ranks of the shrinking rebel armies – and those still at home.  The Confederate will to continue the fight, despite the ever-increasing odds against them, was as much a target for Sherman as the Georgia capital.

Despite the appeals in the southern presses for the people of Georgia to rise up and smite the Yankee army, these tracts only served to prove amusement for Sherman and his men – and perhaps a bit of anxiety for those in the north who were out of communication with him.  In his Memoirs Sherman also noted that some of his men enjoyed holding mock sessions of the Georgia legislature where “a proposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, which was well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote!”  But he quickly noted that “I was not present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, and enjoyed the joke” (666).   Doubtless he also appreciated the appointment of committees “to call forthwith on Governor Brown and President Davis for the purpose of landing official kicks on their official rumps”(Foote 647).

About the same time that Slocum’s men were frolicking in the white gothic-style Georgia State House, Howard’s men found entertainment of a darker variety.  The first division was on duty on the outside of Griswoldville, when a regiment of Midwestern boys sporting the new Spencer repeating rifles were charged by a force of Georgia militiamen.  Wave after wave struck the Union line with undaunted courage and reckless abandon.  “The Jonnies did not realize, even after seven charges, that they were being cut to pieces by repeating rifles.  The Rebs also fired too high” one blue veteran recalled later (Davis 55).

When the Confederate force finally limped away, leaving the field to the Union troops, Howard’s veterans went out to survey the field only to find boys no more than fifteen or sixteen and old men.  One wounded lad explained to his captors that Wheeler’s cavalry had rounded him and his companions up and herded them into line, drafting them at the sword-point.  No training, no time to prepare; prisoners of their own kind, forced into combat.

The Griswoldville affair was not the only ugly chapter in the history of Sherman’s “March.”  Another would occur later as the army began its approach to the coast over the lowlands.  During the course of the journey an ever-growing army of freedmen escorted the Yankee force.  Sherman and his generals tried to persuade them to stay put, trying to reason with them that if the army was forced to feed all of them, it would endanger the mission by taking bread from the mouths of soldiers.  But try as they may the group grew and grew.  In early December, as the Fourteenth Corps crossed Ebenezer Creek, Gen. Jefferson C. Davis hurried his troops over the pontoon bridge, then before any of the African-American onlookers could cross, had the bridge suddenly cut and pulled back – leaving the path to freedom abruptly blocked by the swollen stream.  Pandemonium ensued.  When many rushed into the water unmindful of the current or even the inability to swim – some clutching babies in their arms, sympathetic soldiers tried to save them.  In the end dozens were drowned, some successfully crossed; others turned back only to be apprehended by Wheeler’s cavalry and returned to slavery.  Davis was never punished.

Guns at Ft. McAlister looking out across Ossabaw Sound.

Guns at Ft. McAlister looking out across Ossabaw Sound.

From the beginning, the only fight Sherman really anticipated was for Savannah at the end of the “March.”  From a study of his maps, Sherman could see that the key to linking up with the Union navy, preliminary to the fight for Savannah, was the Ogeechee River.  Waiting in Ossabaw Sound, the navy would doubtless be on the look-out for Sherman, but could not run up the Ogeechee because a stout bastion, Fort McAllister, with its big guns, blocked the way.  On December 13th, the day set for the attack on the fort, Sherman and Howard climbed the roof of an old rice mill and there spotted a gunboat.  Then followed a legendary exchange: “Who are you?” “General Sherman,” the answer went back, and when this was followed by another question: “Is Fort McAllister taken?” Sherman replied, “Not yet, but it will be in a minute” (Foote 652).  And it very nearly was within that span.  After just a few minutes, Union flags were planted on the parapet.  The ease of capture was, in part, the valor of Howard’s men, but also because the fort very clearly was never designed to repel a rearward land assault.

Historical Marker at Ft. McAlister.

Historical Marker at Ft. McAlister.

After the fall of Ft. McAllister, the Confederate commander in Savannah, Gen. Hardee, knew his position was quickly growing untenable.  Already he was moving men out of the city and across to the South Carolina shore.  On December 22nd, Sherman rode into Savannah with his staff.  Though he had spent the intervening period preparing for an assault, he was relieved that Hardee had made that unnecessary.  Not long after, when Sherman found a U.S. Treasury agent already at work in Savannah counting cotton bales, the general – who had a low tolerance for such bureaucrats – began to lecture him.  Trying to soothe Sherman, if not distract him entirely, he suggested that the general offer the city to Lincoln as a Christmas present.  The gambit worked.  And if Sherman went down in history as the originator of the idea, the agent did not mind too much, so long as the red-headed general left him alone to count his cotton.

Sherman's Headquarters in Savannah.

Sherman’s Headquarters in Savannah.

 

Bibliography

Davis, Burke.  Sherman’s March.  New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

Foote, Shelby.  The Civil War: A Narrative.  New York: Random House, 1963.

Marszalek, John F.  Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order.  New York: The Free Press, 1993.

Sherman, William Tecumseh.  Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman.  New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1990.

Trudeau, Noah Andre.  Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea.  New York: Harper Perennial, 2008.



James Wilson and the Battle of Nashville, Part I

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James Wilson, seated in the center facing the viewer's right, with his staff at City Point Virginia in 1864.  Courtesy of the Library of Congress

James Wilson, seated in the center facing the viewer’s right, with his staff at City Point Virginia in 1864. Courtesy of the Library of Congress

The weather was gradually changing, perhaps for the better. For several days, the Union troopers had been pelted with snow and sleet. It had been so harsh that only the woodcutters had been out in the precipitation. With a thaw setting in, the time came to finally move. On December 15, 1864, those troopers who had endured the foul weather would take part in a massive assault on the Confederate lines southeast of the city of Nashville. For Brig. Gen. James Harrison Wilson, his cavalrymen would be shouldering a heavy load in the attack. The next few days would help determine if Wilson was up to the challenge.

Wilson was a native of Illinois and had graduated from West Point in the Class of 1860. By virtue of his placement in the class (sixth) Wilson was assigned to the Topographical Engineers and served in the Pacific Northwest prior to the outbreak of the war. The Chief Engineer of the Port Royal expedition, Wilson would later serve on the staff of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan before being transferred to the Western Theater. Assigned to the staff of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Wilson would be made Inspector General of the Army of the Tennessee during the Vicksburg Campaign. Returning to Grant’s staff following the Mississippi city’s fall, Wilson would be promoted to Brigadier General and serve under Grant at Chattanooga. In February, 1864, Wilson was transferred to Washington, D.C. to head the Cavalry Bureau. By the opening of the spring campaign of 1864, Wilson was in command of the Third Division, Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

James Wilson, shown here as a Major General.

James Wilson, shown here as a Major General.

Wilson had proven himself to be an adept engineer and administrator, but he had little experience commanding cavalry in the field. The learning curve would be a sharp one. In the Wilderness, Wilson botched his first assignment of screening the army’s march across the Rapidan, allowing Robert E. Lee to surprise and bring the Yankee movement to a grinding halt. During the Yellow Tavern Raid, Wilson led his division into the teeth of the Richmond defenses, nearly ensnaring the entire cavalry corps. That June, Wilson would lead an ultimately expedition against the Southside Railroad, one of the key lines supplying the city of Petersburg. While attempting to rejoin the rest of the army, his division was nearly cut off and captured. While the failure of the so-called “Wilson-Kautz Raid” lay more at the feet of his superiors than Wilson, he was a favorite of Grant and thus retained his command.

Wilson’s Third Division would be transferred to the Shenandoah Valley later in the summer to augment Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan’s army. Wilson would spearhead the Union infantry advance and cover the army’s left flank at the Battle of Third Winchester. Then on September 30th, Wilson received orders sending him back to the West. At the request of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, Wilson’s next assignment would be as the Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi. Arguably, this elevation in responsibility was more in part for Wilson’s administrative and logistical aptitude, rather than his battlefield accomplishments.

Wilson’s first task in his new role was to prepare and outfit Maj. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick’s division for Sherman’s planned “March to the Sea” through the interior of Georgia. The more pressing situation, however, lay to north in Tennessee. After the fall of Atlanta, John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee had moved into north Georgia in an effort to strike at Sherman’s supply lines and draw Sherman after them. When Sherman refused to abandon his hard won ground, Hood decided to strike into Tennessee. Wilson was needed there, to assist Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in repelling Hood’s imminent invasion. Joining Maj. Gen. Schofield near Columbia, Wilson and his troopers prepared to meet the enemy.

On November 28, Lieut. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, commanding Hood’s cavalry crossed the Duck River beyond Schofield’s flank near Columbia, Tennessee. Wilson apprised Schofield  of the potential threat of being cut off to the north and Schofield set his infantry in motion for Spring Hill the next day. Barely missing a major engagement with Hood in near Spring Hill, Schofield continued to Franklin where he turned to face the Rebels.

On November 30, in one of the great frontal assaults of the war, Hood sent the Army of Tennessee against Schofield’s lines. During the attack, one of Forrest’s division commanded by William Jackson crossed the Harpeth River in the hopes of attacking the Union rear. Waiting for him was one of Wilson’s divisions commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch. Supporting Hatch was a brigade commanded by Col. John Croxton. Together, this combined force pushed back Jackson and secured the Union left and rear.

Despite repulsing Hood’s attacks, Schofield decided to abandon the field at Franklin and withdraw to join Thomas in the heavily fortified city of Nashville. Arriving there on December 1, the condition of Wilson’s troopers drew first priority. Going into camp at Edgefield, Wilson wrote later “the first week of December was the busiest and most important period in the reorganization of the cavalry forces”. Here, Wilson applied his superb skills in administration. “Clothes were drawn for the men, the horses were rested, reshod and well fed, extra shoes were fitted, new arms were issued, old ones were repaired and equipments of every kind were put in order. As fast as horses were received, they were issued where they would do the most good” he remembered.

Meanwhile, as Wilson rested and refitted, the Army of Tennessee arrived and established a line southeast of the city. Hood’s position covered the major thoroughfares running out of the city. From the Nolensville Pike in the east, the Confederates line stretched across the Franklin and Granny White Pikes, finally ending in the west on the Hillsboro Pike. With the Confederates in position outside Nashville, it would only be a matter of time before the two sides would meet in a desperate engagement that very well determine the outcome of the campaign. For James Wilson, the coming battle would prove whether he could live up to the faith that Grant and Sherman had placed in him.

 

 


On Victory

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Douglas MacArthur famously said, “In war, there is no substitute for victory.” Yet as one gen-george-thomas-at-chickamaugalooks at the Civil War, many battles seem not to offer a clear winner, or at the least, they offer a complicated definition of who wins. The victors of some battles are still debated. This post is an effort to resolve the confusion on what “victory” actually means.

Before proceeding, it is important to define terms. These are largely taken from the U.S. Army War College, which divides war into three levels:

– STRATEGIC victories are ones that achieve major national objectives or alter the course of the war (Fort Donelson and Vicksburg for the Union; Seven Days for the Confederacy)

– OPERATIONAL victories advance strategic goals, and/or help a specific campaign succeed or fail (Shelbyville and Raymond for the Union; Second Winchester and Munfordville for the Confederacy)

– TACTICAL victories define who wins or loses on a specific battlefield or portion of a field (Malvern Hill for the Union; Fredericksburg for the Confederacy)

In many battles, one side wins clear-cut victories in all of these categories; the battles for Atlanta come to mind as examples of Union tactical and operational victories that result in a strategic Union success when the city falls.

Where confusion and debate sets in is when one side wins one level but not another. The Wilderness was a Confederate tactical victory, but the Federals held open the way south, thus giving them an operational and strategic victory. Perryville is another such case: the Confederacy won a tactical victory, but lost operationally and strategically because Federal operations could continue without change. In the Chickamauga campaign, the Union lost the battle but won the campaign because of the capture of Chattanooga—which was their main objective in the first place. The Army of the Potomac won tactical victories in most of the Seven Days Battles, but Federal retreats handed the operational and strategic victories to the Confederacy.

At first blush, it may appear that there is little difference between operational and strategic victories. The success or failure of individual campaigns/operations has strategic consequences; most Civil War campaigns/operations led to one climactic battle, so whoever won the battle often won the operational and strategic prizes. The differences become apparent in campaigns with multiple battles, like the Maryland Campaign of 1862: the Confederates won an operational victory at Harper’s Ferry, the Union won an operational victory at South Mountain, and the climactic battle at Antietam was a tactical stalemate that ended as a Union operational and strategic victory because it forced the Confederates to withdraw back to Virginia.

These definitions also apply at sea. The Union won a strategic, operational, and tactical victory at Mobile Bay in 1864; the Confederacy did likewise at Drewry’s Bluff in 1862. The CSS Albemarle won two tactical victories over Union forces in North Carolina, but failed to break the blockade, thus giving the operational and strategic advantage to the Union.

A final word regards stalemates: generally a stalemate ranks as a defensive victory, as it means a halting of the attacker’s operations short of their tactical, operational, or strategic objectives.

There may be no substitute for victory, but its definition can be elusive. By assessing through this prism, the winners and losers come into focus.


The Swamp Lizard Gets His Nickname

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Federal soldiers moving across the Salkehatchie. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Federal soldiers moving across the Salkehatchie.
Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

As the second week of February, 1865 opened Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s armies were nearing the South Carolina capitol, Columbia.  Since leaving Savannah, the Yankees had covered well over one hundred miles. In the course of their trek, the armies had crossed the Salkehatchie River and the North and South Forks of the Edisto River. The bridging of the Salkehatchie had been the most important.  Winter rains had flooded its banks and the surrounding area was an overgrown swamp. This difficult terrain increased the risk of the Federals getting bogged down and delaying the march. Establishing a bridgehead on the north bank was critical to getting the columns under way. Leading the armies across the river was the XVII Corps division commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Anthony Mower.

Mower was considered one of the most aggressive division commanders in either of Sherman’s armies. He was a veteran of the early Mississippi Valley Campaigns, Corinth, Vicksburg and the Red River Campaign. His reputation as a hard fighter along with his experience as an Engineer during the Mexican War made Mower the ideal candidate for navigating the swollen Salkehatchie and its surrounding area.

On the first day of the operation, Mower “found the causeway through the swamp obstructed with felled timber and five bridges leading through the swamp destroyed”. Undeterred, Mower ordered up a regiment to protect his pioneers to clear a path through the swamp and open an avenue of advance for the rest of his command. The next day, Mower engaged Confederate forces and drove them back across Broxton’s Bridge. Continuing on, the Yankees encountered stiff enemy resistance. Leaving Colonel John Tillson’s brigade to occupy the Rebels on his front, Mower took the balance of his command around their flank. He then ordered the 25th Wisconsin infantry forward into the Confederate line. The Badgers “gallantly charged up the toward the enemy’s works and drove them…rapidly”.

Although this action was successful, the division was still in the swamp, which Mower estimated to be about a mile long. In water at an estimated one to eight feet in depth and “mud about waist deep”, Mower set his men to felling trees for a corduroy road.

The Union pioneers took up their construction work again the following morning. A soldier from the 32nd Wisconsin remembered “our regiment went into the swamp about daylight and were in there until about four o’clock in the afternoon before they affected a crossing. The woods were too thick to use much artillery but the musketry fire was murderous, a continual roll all the while. We drove the enemy from his fortifications and captured about thirty prisoners…our regt. got great praise from the Genl. commanding”.

By the end of the third day of the operation, Mower’s division had opened a route across the Salkehatchie and its surrounding swamps for the armies. Mower would shower praise on his men, writing that “no troops could behave better than did those of my division, they being in the water for nearly two days…they endured this without murmuring, seeming to feel confident that their labors would be crowned with success”. At the same time, the praise was reciprocated.

During the fighting, Mower had spent much of his time on the front lines with his soldiers, often sleeping in the icy swamp with them. His actions endeared him to his men and one morning after rising, Mower was seen to shake a heavy frost off his coat. The soldiers who witnessed this gave him the sobriquet “Swamp Lizard”. Interestingly, Mower was no stranger to nicknames. He had become known as “the Wolf” earlier in the war for a daring reconnaissance prior to the Battle of Iuka.

The Swamp Lizard. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The Swamp Lizard. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

I would like to extend a special thank you to Dr. John Coski of the Museum of the Confederacy. Dr. Coski generously provided a copy of an ancestor’s letter that was used in this post.

 


The Swamp Lizard Turns the Flank: Joseph Mower’s Assault at Bentonville

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Joseph Mower. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Joseph Mower. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Reveling in victory, Maj. Gen. Joseph Mower watched as the enemy to his immediate front collapsed, the Confederates scampering to the rear for safety. To his immediate front, Mower could make out the buildings that constituted the village of Bentonville. His probe had completely broken the gray position- overrunning Gen. Joseph Johnston’s headquarters-but now Mower was advancing blind. He had to find out what was out in front of him. Turning to the nearest regiment, the 64th Illinois Infantry, Mower ordered them ahead. This act was characteristic of this Connecticut Yankee who had earned a reputation in Sherman’s armies as an aggressive officer.

 Mower began his military service in the War with Mexico as an Engineer. In the mid-1850s, he received an officer’s commission in the 1st U.S. Infantry. By the outbreak of the Civil War, Mower had risen to the rank of Captain. After serving in Maj. Gen. John Pope’s campaigns on the Mississippi River, Mower was promoted to Colonel and received command of the 11th Missouri Infantry. Rising to brigade command in the fall of 1862, Mower fought at Iuka and Corinth. Promoted to Brigadier General in March 1863, Mower led his men during the Vicksburg Campaign. He served in Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson Smith’s XVI Corps during the Red River Campaign and later fought at Tupelo. On August 12, 1864, he was promoted to Major General. As Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman prepared for his “March to the Sea”, he requested that Mower be transferred from Missouri to serve with his armies. Mower became a division commander in the XVII Corps of the Army of the Tennessee. It was during the opening actions of Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign in January, 1865, that Mower would earn the nickname “the Swamp Lizard.”

Like the rest of the Army of the Tennessee, Mower’s division arrived on March 20th, the second day of the battle. Leading the XVII Corps onto the battlefield, Mower initially took a position south of the Goldsboro Road in an attempt to link up with Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s Army of Georgia, only to have Maj. Gen. William Hazen’s division complete the connection. Mower then moved his men into reserve north of the road.

 March 21st opened with Gen. Joseph Johnston’s Army of the South and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s armies skirmishing with one another. Late in the morning, Mower received permission from his corps commander, Maj. Gen. Frank Blair, to launch a reconnaissance in force. Interestingly, Mower decided to take along two of the three brigades of his division-all but one regiment from his second brigade were guarding the wagon trains. Blair gave his permission and Mower moved his men around to the far right of the Union line.

Mower wrote afterwards “I pushed my command…for the purpose of closing on the enemy’s flank…then formed in line of battle, and throwing out skirmishers moved forward…in moving forward the brigade on the right (Brigadier General [John] Fuller’s) encountered a very bad swamp, and I found it necessary to halt the Third Brigade some three quarters of an hour to allow the First Brigade to pass the swamp.”

 He continued “At this time our skirmishers advancing met those of the enemy; they being thus aware of our approach opened a fire of artillery upon us. At this time our skirmishers met those of the enemy…As soon as General Fuller had again formed on the right I moved forward, driving the enemy from a line of skirmish pits which they had occupied, and capturing a caisson belonging to the battery which had been firing upon us and which they were unable to get away owing to two of the horses being shot. After gaining the crest of the hill I ordered a halt.”

Mower's division advanced across this ground toward the Confederate line beyond.

Mower’s division advanced across this ground toward the Confederate line beyond.

The Union infantry had crashed into Brig. Gen. Matthew C. Butler’s South Carolina troopers, commanded this day by Brig. Gen. Thomas Logan and overrun the guns of Captain William Earle’s battery. Fortuitously, the Yankees had overwhelmed the thinly held Confederate left and the village of Bentonville within sight a few hundred yards away. It was at this time that Mower dispatched the 64th Illinois. He could not have known it then, but just beyond the village lay the Mill Creek Bridge and the Confederates’ only avenue of retreat.

Modern bridge over Mill Creek.

Modern bridge over Mill Creek.

At the critical moment, Mower received a message from one of his brigade commanders that his line did not connect with the rest of the army. In turn Mower ordered his brigades to shift to the left. This maneuver gave the Confederates time to begin their counterattack. Johnston as well as his subordinates had recognized the threat and like locusts, both Confederate cavalry and infantry began to swarm onto the Mower’s brigades.

 While Brig. Gen. Pierce M.B. Young’s horsemen-led by Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton-drove the 64th Illinois out of Bentonville, elements from Col Baxter Smith’s brigade moved forward. The famous 8th Texas, “Terry’s Texas Rangers”, along with the 4th Tennessee struck the Federal infantrymen. Maj. Gen. Frank Cheatham’s division from the Army of Tennessee also joined the assault, pushing back Mower’s division and pressing in from three sides. A soldier in the 32nd Wisconsin recalled that it was “the hardest fight that we have ever had…the Johnnies came very near taking us all in, they came down on our Division in overwhelming numbers.”

Although Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard had pushed out the Army of the Tennessee’s skirmishers in support of Mower, Sherman was furious that the fighting had escalated. The commanding general did not want to bring on an engagement; he was more concerned with moving on to Goldsboro and resupplying his men.

Pressed in on three sides, Mower finally ordered a withdrawal. With his line restored, Johnston realized that his thin line was too vulnerable. Late that night, he began a hurried withdrawal. On March 23, Sherman’s armies finally reached Goldsboro, completing their march through the Carolinas.

Mower would eventually be elevated to command the XX Corps in the Army of Georgia. After the war, he would lead two all-black infantry units, the 39th U.S. Infantry and then the 25th U.S. Infantry. He died of pneumonia on January 6, 1870 while heading the Department of Louisiana in New Orleans. The “Swamp Lizard” rests in Arlington National Cemetery.

A special thanks to Dr. John Coski of the Museum of the Confederacy who graciously provided a letter from an ancestor who served in the 32nd Wisconsin that was used in this post.


Day Three: The Road to Vicksburg

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JacksonBattlefieldParkPart seven in a series

“You’re heading into banjo country,” a friend of ours warns us. He’s worked at Vicksburg, and we’ve asked him for advice on following Grant’s route across Mississippi.

We spent the night in Jackson, so we’re going to hit some of the battlefields on our way into Vicksburg. We’ll hit them our of order, and we won’t hit all of them, but we want to at least get a sense of the terrain Grant’s men crossed as they outflanked the Confederate citadel through open country.

Our first stop is Jackson’s Battlefield Park. “Uh-oh,” Dan says as he looks up the address. “Two people were killed there last January, and a body was found there on May 11.”

Sounds like the battle of Jackson is still going on on some level.

The battle of Jackson took place on May 14, 1863—two weeks after he crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg. On May 1, he fought Confederates at Port Gibson, then marched northeast to Raymond, where he fought more Confederates on May 12. Then Jackson. Then Champion Hill on May 16, and Big Black River on May 17. That finally brought him to the edge of Vicksburg on May 18, where he besieged the city until July 4.

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We hit Jackson first, but it doesn’t take long. The neighborhood has seen better days. So have the two cannons on display. But at least there are no dead bodies.

RaymondArtilleryWe head down to Raymond next. The town square is quaint and friendly, and volunteers are planting flowers around the corners. Farther down the road, we find the battlefield park, including an array of artillery that wows us. I haven’t seen so many artillery pieces since the line-up facing Shiloh’s Hornet’s Nest.

The park has a nice trail system, although we don’t have the time to fully explore it because we’re falling behind schedule. “Hurry up,” I joke. “I hear banjos.”

In fact, the trip has been pleasant and the countryside gorgeous. We couldn’t ask for a nicer drive.

Our next stop: Champion Hill. First, we past a monument that marks the spot where Confederate Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman was killed while trying to cover the Confederate retreat.

TilghmanDeathSpotChampion Hill was the largest of the battles Grant fought while on the march. Confederates under Gen. John Pemberton sorted out of Vicksburg only to get a drubbing at Federal hands.

Finding Champion Hill proves a little difficult because Champion Hill Road actually skirts the hill but doesn’t go to it. We have to resort to breaking out an old issue of Blue & Gray, which gives us the directions we need. The fight centers around “The Crossroads,” which is a modest “T” in the road in the woods. It had once been a four-corners, but one of the roads has devolved into an overgrown trace.

We find the other end of that road trace behind the Champion Hill Missionary Baptist Church. “Oh, you couldn’t pay me enough to go walking down through those woods, all the rattlesnakes down there,” says Ray, a carpenter who greets us warmly when we pull into the church’s lot. It all comes out as a single syllable in a smooth Mississippi accent. “Last week, a whole busload of folks pulled up over there and parked right there behind the church and went walking down there through the woods and walked down that road.”

ChampionHouseSiteHe’s delighted to have us there and takes a break from his work on a small shed to talk Civil War with us. “Miss Matilda, during the battle, she hid in her basement,” he tells us, walking us over to the former house site, which is in the church’s back yard. “My sister, last week, she made a demonstration. Had a hole in the ground over there for the cellar and came up out of it to show people.”

We take our leave from Ray and head to the Big Black, but the road dead-ends before it gets to the river. “Sherman crossed here,” Dan says. “Grant crossed here, too.” Not us. Ray warned us that recent heavy rains probably have the river running at flood stage, anyway, which we see as we finally pass over it while driving on I-20. “The Big Black is brown,” Dan quips.

We’re fewer than a dozen miles from Vicksburg. We’ve had a much easier time than Grant.

It’s time to get ready for the siege.


Whiskey and War: The Case of Joseph Mower at the Battle of Corinth

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Soldiers statue outside the Corinth Interpretive Center.

Soldiers statue outside the Corinth Interpretive Center.

Over the course of the last year and a half, one of the officers who has grabbed my attention is Maj. Gen. Joseph Mower. Having served in the War with Mexico, Mower compiled an impressive combat record during the Civil War, fighting at Island Number 10, Iuka and Vicksburg. He participated in the Red River Campaign and the March to the Sea. He probably had his finest hour at Bentonville, where he turned Gen. Joseph Johnston’s left flank and came within a hair of cutting off the line of retreat of the Confederates. What is all the more extraordinary is that Mower began the war as a Captain of a company in the 1st U.S. Infantry and ended as the commander of the XX Corps in the Army of Georgia, all without a West Point education. Similar to many of his contemporaries, however, Mower does have question marks on his record. Last week’s visit to Corinth left me to further contemplate them and their possible answers. 

Joseph Mower. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Joseph Mower. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

On the morning of October 4th, 1862, Mower, then a Colonel and brigade commander executed a reconnaissance of the enemy lines. Apparently the night before, Mower had been imbibing liquor and apparently had become heavily intoxicated. Despite his condition, he led his men out on horseback. While positioning his skirmishers, Mower encountered the Confederates. The Rebels unleashed a volley, striking Mower in the neck and killing his horse. Pinned beneath the animal, he was quickly taken prisoner. During the ensuing Confederate withdrawal from the field, Mower took advantage of the confusion and made his way back to the Union lines. Mower was able to convince the Union commander, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans that he was indeed not drunk. Writing after the war, Rosecrans indicated that he believed Mower. Several months later, Mower received his Brigadier General’s star. Rather than a roadblock, Corinth became a stepping stone.

There is, however, one more piece to consider: Mower’s health.

At the end of the Mexican War when Mower was discharged from the U.S. Engineers, the reason  given was for disability. Despite his health or overall physical condition, Mower received a Second Lieutenant’s commission in 1855. At the culmination of the Vicksburg Campaign, Mower went home on furlough. During this time, he received a medical examination. The surgeons found that he was suffering from “general debility” and was deemed to be “unfit for duty.” Having experienced the Mississippi heat first hand last week, it could not have helped Mower’s disposition. Eventually, he returned to duty. At the opening of the Carolinas Campaign, Mower’s infantry led the advance of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s Army Group into the South Carolina swamps. The weather was bitterly cold and Mower spent much of his time out on the skirmish line. One of his staff officers lamented that his exposure to the elements during the campaign contributed to his health problems that took Mower’s life in 1870.

There is ample evidence that Mower was not in the best health during the war. His nearly constant time in the field took its toll on him. The question remains as to why. Certainly Mower was devoted to the Union cause. At the same time, despite the eventual promotion and continued rise, did the stain of Corinth linger in the back of Mower’s mind? And to the point where he would put his own life in jeopardy for the sake of restoring his personal honor? I am only left to wonder.

The Texas Monument stands today in an area that saw heavy fighting during the battle.

The Texas Monument stands today in an area that saw heavy fighting during the battle.


Some Reflections on William Tecumseh Sherman

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General-Sherman-AtlantaI must admit, it is exceptionally difficult to reflect on William Tecumseh Sherman. No question, he was one of the most enigmatic individuals of the American Civil War. The mere mention of his name in general company today, 150 years after the end of the conflict, still sparks an intense discussion. More often than not through the course of the conversation it will be made known that Sherman single handedly burned the entire South, which is not necessarily true. But is Sherman’s legacy, which is the subject of my presentation at next month’s Emerging Civil War symposium, the March to the Sea?

To be sure, his rise was not as explosive as that of his peers. Sherman led a brigade at First Manassas but was then later relieved from command of the Department of the Cumberland. Shortly thereafter an Ohio paper accused him of being insane. The whole ordeal nearly broke him, however he persevered and was given an assignment by Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck. This into and of itself may be the key to Sherman’s later success: during the early stages of the war, he was able to establish and maintain positive relationships with his superiors, such as Halleck and U.S. Grant through his dependability and willingness to diligently take on any assignment. Even then, Sherman struggled in command and an argument could be made that he was an average combat officer.

Sherman fought well at Shiloh and for the most part during the Vicksburg Campaign. Like any other commander, he also met with a fair share of struggles at Chickasaw Bayou and Chattanooga. But when Grant was promoted to Lieutenant General and became the head of all the Union armies, Sherman was his first choice to take his place in the Western Theater.

Complicated as his ascendency was so too was the man himself. Sherman is and remains a bundle of contradictions. He was a loving and devoted father who shunned organized religion despite the impact it had on his marriage and family; a combat officer who was often reluctant to commit his men to battle and a man who did not believe in employing black troops in battle, but quite possibly through his operations freed more slaves than any other Union commander.

Only when we start to unravel this bundle, no matter how complicated it may be, will we begin to scrape the surface of Sherman’s legacy. Doing so will give us a deeper understanding of the man along with the times in which he lived.



The Stakes of Vicksburg

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On April 30, and May 1, 1863, Union Major General U.S. Grant crossed his Army of the Tennessee over the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg. He then cut loose from his supply sources and plunged inland to surround the city and defeat the Confederates.

VicksburgCampaignAprilJuly63sm

Grant’s move has been cited as a great risk, which it certainly was. He had to win or face utter ruin of his army and defeat – the starkest all-or-nothing proposition. With hindsight, we know it worked. But what of occasions where such a bold move doesn’t work?

Understanding armies that failed in similar circumstances helps define exactly the stakes of the Vicksburg Campaign in May 1863. Let me provide three examples of such failures.

In March of 1862, Confederates under Earl Van Dorn attacked Union Major General Ben Curtis’ forces at Pea Ridge. Van Dorn, who outnumbered Curtis, aggressively split his army and sent part on a flank march into the Federal rear. For speed, he left his supply wagons behind. His men straggled, and arrived tired and hungry for the battle’s opening on March 7. Confederate attacks were piecemeal and not as vigorous as needed. The next day Confederate artillery ran out of ammunition and Curtis swept the field with a counterattack. Van Dorn’s routed and hungry men took a week to reform.

In September 1942, General Kiyotake Kawaguchi led an 8,000-man brigade to dislodge the U.S. Marine beachhead on Guadalcanal. He left most of his supplies and support behind, and marched his men through trackless jungle to launch a converging attack on the Marine perimeter. Over two days (September 12-13), Kawaguchi’s men hammered the Marines with repeated attacks that all failed. Kawaguchi took five days to retrace his steps, and another month to ready his brigade for another try. Reinforced with the 2d “Sendai” Division under Masao Maruyama, the Japanese tried the same plan again in late October. Movement delays resulted in piecemeal attacks between October 23 and 26, all of which the Marines (reinforced themselves by U.S. Army troops) repulsed. The Sendai Division had lost over 50% of its strength and retreated in an agonizing march back to camp, a diseased and starving group of combat-ineffective men. This was the last Japanese attack against the beachhead.

In March of 1944, nearly 100,000 Japanese of the Fifteenth Army plunged into India from Burma. The commander, General Renya Mutaguchi, planned for his men to carry rations and eat whatever they could capture from the British. Mutaguchi’s plan counted on capturing the bases at Imphal, Kohima, and Dimapur and using their supplies to sustain the offensive. Unlike other British units before that had succumbed to Japanese attacks, General Sir William Slim’s British Fourteenth Army stood firm at Imphal and Kohima for weeks. Air resupply kept Slim’s men in fighting trim, whereas lack of supplies withered the Japanese and forced them into desperate attacks (all repulsed). By June, after three months of fighting, Mutaguchi withdrew back to Burma. British pursuers found thousands of emaciated and dead men lining the retreat routes, victims of disease and starvation. Mutaguchi lost 85-90% of the men he had led to India, and sustained Japan’s greatest single land defeat ever. Conversely, Slim’s victory at Imphal and Kohima has been called one of Britain’s greatest battles.

Collectively, these examples show the fate that Grant courted in 1863 when he cut loose from his supplies and moved against Vicksburg from the south. He risked the Army of the Tennessee in a daring maneuver that succeeded brilliantly, altering the course of the war. That he avoided any of these calamities is a testament to his leadership and the quality of his men as marchers and fighters.

Top: Grant’s advance on Vicksburg, May 1863.

Bottom: The Japanese Imphal-Kohima Offensive, 1944. The British 4 and 33 Corps made up Fourteenth Army under Slim, while Mutaguchi’s Fifteenth Army included the 15th, 31st, and 33d Divisions.

Imphal-Kohima USA-CBI-Command-10

 


Winfield Scott Reconsidered

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On this day in 1841, precisely 175 years ago, Major General Winfield Scott became Commanding General of the U.S. Army. He held this post for 20 years and four months, longer than any other Commanding General or U.S. Army Chief of Staff to date, retiring as a Brevet Lieutenant General on November 1, 1861.General-Winfield-Scott-1835

To Civil War audiences, Scott is something of a comical figure: a fat old man who can’t mount his horse, not to mention an object of derision by George McClellan and younger officers. His nickname “Old Fuss and Feathers” seems to imply a dodding old man more interested in pomp than in crushing the Confederacy.

This perspective is grossly unfair to Scott, who in fact was one of the great soldiers of the 19th Century and also played an important,if sometimes hidden, role in the Civil War.

Winfield Scott was born in Virginia in 1786. After serving in the Virginia militia, he commanded Regular troops on the Niagara frontier during the War of 1812. His successes against crack British troops earned him a Brigadier General’s star and the brevet rank of Major General. These experiences taught him that only discipline, bearing, and steadiness under fire could bring victory on the battlefield.  Ever after, Scott focused on instilling these values in his troops, and it was then that the “Old Fuss and Feathers” nickname came about. (George Patton in World War II, it should be noted, subscribed to this same philosophy.)

Between 1815 and 1841, Scott was involved in executing U.S. policy that was often controversial; it seems he was picked because of his integrity to follow orders. He was in command of forces poised to move on South Carolina during the 1832 Nullification Crisis; superintended the Cherokee Trail of Tears; and won the Second Seminole and Creek Wars. He was a noted soldier-scholar, translating European drill manuals, and authored a tactics manual in the 1850s.

As Commanding General, Scott oversaw the transformation of the Army, including engineering and mapping expeditions in the West, the creation of cavalry regiments, and the adoption of rifled muskets and cannon. He also commanded the Army in battle with great skill; his Mexico City campaign, largest and most complex U.S. Army campaign since 1781, earned him the tribute “greatest living general” by the Duke of Wellington.

Scott ran for President in 1852, and the Whig Party dumped their incumbent President to give him the nomination. To date Scott is the tallest person (6’5″) ever nominated by a major party for the Presidency.

In 1861, the Virginia-born Scott remained loyal to the United States. Although his body was failing him, his mind remained clear. Scott planted the seeds of Union victory with his Anaconda Plan, calling for a blockade of the Confederacy and a Mississippi River campaign. After retirement to West Point, Lincoln often consulted with him on matters of strategy. Scott lived to see reunion and died in 1866. He is buried at West Point.

Winfield Scott today is one of only three Americans to hold the rank of general officer in three major American wars: The War of 1812, The Mexican War, and the Civil War. The others are Douglas MacArthur (WWI, WWII, and Korea) and Lewis B. Hershey (WWII, Korea, and Vietnam).

Above: Winfield Scott in 1835.


Question of the Week: 9/26-10/2/16

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Question-HeaderWould you consider Vicksburg a combined campaign? How dependent was General Grant on the naval forces of Admiral David D. Porter?


Book Review: “A Civil War Captain and His Lady”

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It is a rare thing when a series of letters over 150 years old is found intact, but to find two sets of them, in response to each other–well, that is cause for celebration.

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Author Gene Barr has been lucky enough to have not only found such a collection, but wise enough to purchase it whole and work it, all for the benefit of today’s readers. His edits and annotations result in a new book of letters, A Civil War Captain and His Lady. Barr, currently the President and CEO of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry, comes by his Civil War credentials with a life-long interest in the war, including a term as Chair of the National Civil War Museum in Harrisburg, PA. Through a roundabout path, one that began in an unheated cabin on Lake George in Wisconsin, a packet of about 75 letters, photographs, and a worn leather memorial book containing newspaper clippings and telegrams came to the attention of a business colleague of author Barr, who purchased the collection. The letters and ephemera are the story of the three-year courtship of Joshua Moore and Jennie Lindsay.

Joshua Moore, a 27-year-old Irish immigrant, was a student at Illinois’ Monmouth College when the war broke out. He enlisted and was elected captain of the 17th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. The men were sent to Peoria, Illinois to train, and it was while he was in training camp that he met 19-year-old Jennie Lindsay. Apparently the attraction was instantaneous and mutual, because they agreed to write to each other. They wrote letters frequently during the three years of Moore’s term of service with the 17th Illinois Infantry. The reader follows their emerging courtship, conducted in proper Victorian fashion, and filled with religious references indicating that “God’s will be done,” in all circumstances, even if they wished the circumstances could be different.

Jennie Lindsay was not your average Union belle–her father was Senator John Lindsay, who was initially supportive of the Union war effort (wonderful stuff on the combined maneuvers of Grant & Porter to move Grant’s men past Vicksburg on pages 191-195, from Lindsay’s own recollections as an observer). However, as the war continued, he began to fall under the sway of men like Clement Vallandigham, who did not support such a prolonged war or the Emancipation Proclamation. The Senator became an ardent Copperhead. This, however, did not seem to interfere with his daughter’s burgeoning love affair with Joshua Moore.

Moore’s letters to Jennie give the reader great insight into the campaigns of Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and Vicksburg. Through the first part of the war, Jennie asked not to be told the military particulars, but after Moore had been writing for over a year, she began to express more interest in his daily actions. Author Barr has used a large variety of letters, newspaper accounts, and other primary sources to fill in the gaps and expand on the campaign responsibilities of the 17th Illinois, giving context to Moore’s personal comments.

By the time of the Siege of Corinth, Jennie had lightened up on what she desired to hear from Joshua. His letters begin to being in more of his battlefield experience, especially concerning the Vicksburg Campaign and the federal occupation of the city in the summer of ’63. Moore also describes his participation in the 1864 Meridian Campaign, and his ordered excursion up the Yazoo River, proving that Union forces could move freely into the interior of Mississippi if desired.

The Captain had become engaged to his Lady by the time his 3-year enlistment was over, and he chose not to re-up his service. He left the army in June of ’64 and soon thereafter married Jennie. He returned to school and became a Presbyterian minister. Subsequent information indicates that Captain Moore was little troubled by any of the grief and nightmares that impacted the lives of so many other soldiers. There are testimonials as to his sterling character and to the stalwart faith he and his wife presented to their small world. The book ends with an “Epilogue: Thereafter,” following the Moores and their descendants into the 21st century.

There is certainly no shortage of books that contain letters from Civil War soldiers, but this one is especially interesting because most of the letters are in sequence. Gene Barr has built upon this foundation with supporting research. There is currently no regimental history of the 17th Illinois, but A Civil War Captain and His Lady is an excellent beginning to a study of Civil War units from the Land of Lincoln. I found this book to be a delightful read on many levels: the stilted Victorian language in the letters quickly becomes easy to understand as the reader watches the relationship between Joshua and Jennie evolve into a full-fledged love affair–one that lasted a lifetime.

  • Gene Barr, A Civil War Captain and His Lady: Love, Courtship, and Combat from Fort Donelson through the Vicksburg Campaign
  • Savas Beatie Publishing, 2016
  • 316 pages of text
  • Appendix I is an interview with author Gene Barr
  • Bibliography and Index included

1860’s Politics: The Challenges of 1862

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Emerging Civil War 1860's Politics HeaderObviously, there wasn’t a presidential election in 1862, but races for the seats in the U.S. Congress were very important. Who would gain control of the legislative branch? How would the outcome of the congressional elections effect the Union war effort?

In this excerpt from The Union’s Great Crisis: The Fall of 1862, the first of ECW’s Digital Series, Chris Kolakowski examines the Union’s autumn elections of 1862 and their impacts. His story picks up at the conclusion of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns.

At the same time the McClellan and Buell waged their battles, Lincoln’s administration fought a major political engagement in the run-up to the midterm elections of 1862. This would be the first national referendum on the Union war effort and Lincoln’s administration – a nearly unique experience for a nation during a civil war. The midterm elections mattered not just for the balance of power in Congress, but in the state houses, where governors and state legislatures were responsible for recruiting and providing volunteer troops for the United States Army. Lincoln’s Republican allies had been an important source of support since war’s start, but Democratic opponents looked to make gains and force changes in policies – especially on slavery and war aims. The Army’s desultory and controversial performances in Kentucky and Maryland did not help the Republican position, and the Democrats used the release of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to attack Lincoln for heavy-handed warmaking and executive excess.

Polling occurred on November 3. As returns came in, it was clear that the Republicans held control of the U.S. Congress despite losing some of their majority. But Democrats captured the governorships of New York and New Jersey, and majorities in the state legislatures of Indiana, Illinois, and New Jersey – all important sources of troops and arms. These reverses meant that Lincoln’s control over the Union war machine would weaken when these electees took office in January 1863.

Lincoln realized that decisive battlefield successes would mitigate many of the effects of these political defeats. Needing political capital in the wake of the election results, and with the final Emancipation Proclamation due for release on January 1, 1863, President Lincoln prodded his forces to make campaigns and engage in “hard, tough fighting that will hurt somebody.”

You can purchase the complete e-book on Amazon!

 

 


The Second City

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The Civil War defined America – that statement is heard often in many quarters. We use that phrase in ECW’s tagline. Many effects from that conflict are quite visible in today’s America, while others are not as apparent at first glance. An example of the latter is a legacy of the Civil War that can be found on maps of the Great Lakes region of the United States – Chicago as the Second City of the USA. Two interstate signs for Chicago and Toledo

In 1860, the United States was growing and ever expanding westward. New York City was the fulcrum of the US economy, and its largest and most important city. It served also as connector on the East Coast between the interior and international destinations. However, there was a horse race among four interior cities as to which would become the Second City – the primary gateway city to the West. New Orleans, Chicago, St. Louis, and Louisville all were in the lists, although Louisville was fading. It will be noted that three of these cities were dependent on rivers; Chicago was not.

The Civil War decided the race. The war, and the closing of the Mississippi River, gave the crown to Chicago as Second City. During and after the war, Chicago was able to both maintain its economic position (the others lost ground), and leverage its access to the Great Lakes trade route and Erie Canal/St. Lawrence River to keep up commerce. It’s key location at the base of Lake Michigan also put the city astride the great westward land corridors. Chicago thus became the gateway to the West.

The effect of this can be seen in this 1926 map of the New York Central and the railways it connects to. Note all the ones that concentrate at Chicago, more than St. Louis.

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This legacy remains visible on modern transportation maps. First, this one – a general overview of the Interstate Highway system. Six highways (55, 57, 80, 88, 90, and 94) all pass through or around Chicago. Note the three transcontinental interstates: 10, 80, 90 – two of which  pass through Chicago.

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Then there’s this map of intermodal rail freight movement in 2010. Thicker lines mean more traffic on those routes. Note the concentration moving from west to east via Chicago toward New York and the Northeast.

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Lastly, this map of truck traffic in 2010; note how several main routes (the thickest lines) run through or near Chicago.

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These maps demonstrate that Chicago remains the major east-west transportation hub in the middle of the country. Although Los Angeles is now the second-largest city in the United States, Chicago remains the primary connector  between east and west. The Civil War gave the Windy City that position, one that it holds today – an enduring legacy of the Civil War.

For further reading, I recommend Nature’s Metropolis by William Cronon.

Top Image: A sign on the Ohio Turnpike (I-80/90) west of Toledo.


The Great Naval Leaders

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On May 10 I lectured about the Battle of Midway to Old Dominion University’s Institute of Learning in Retirement. Over the course of a wonderful discussion, I assessed one of the U.S. commanders, Raymond Spruance, as “one of the greatest fleet commanders in our history.” Driving home, I recalled a conversation with the Bull Run CWRT about my evaluation of the greatest naval battle commanders of the Civil War and World War II.

After some consideration, I thought I’d share my list of the Top 5 Naval Battle Commanders in the history of the U.S. Navy. The sole criteria for inclusion is to have tactically commanded a fleet in battle.

Here they are:

5. George E. Dewey. His opportunistic victory at Manila Bay in May 1898 broke Spanish power in Asia and made the U.S. a force in Asia. A cool leader under fire and veteran of the Civil War, Dewey consciously modeled himself after David Farragut, to the point of asking himself at times “What would Farragut do?”

4. Oliver Hazard Perry. Built a fleet and led it to victory at Lake Erie in September 1813, securing naval dominance of the region. A determined planner and leader, during the course of the fighting he shifted his flag (via open boat) to bring up a reluctant brig, which action turned the battle. His postbattle dispatch “We have met the enemy and they are ours” is a part of U.S. Navy lore. Many cities have been named for him, including Perryville, Kentucky.

3. David Dixon Porter. Son of a naval officer and foster brother to David Farragut, Porter excelled at riverine warfare. He commanded a semi-independent bombardment fleet that helped reduce the forts guarding New Orleans, led fleets on the Mississippi, Red, and James Rivers, and assisted in the taking of Fort Fisher. He always handled his ships well, and made sure they provided maximum possible support to land forces. Arguably, U.S. Grant would not have taken Vicksburg without Porter’s fleet.

2. Raymond Spruance. Won two of the greatest victories in U.S. Navy history at Midway in 1942 and the Philippine Sea (Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) in 1944. He also held the fleet together under the mass kamikaze attacks off Okinawa. A calm and thoughtful officer with a fine strategic brain and good judgment, the modest Spruance shunned the spotlight. His Japanese opponents rated him their most skillful opponent on the high seas.

1. David G. Farragut. Arguably the greatest sailor in U.S. history, Farragut went to sea at age 9, had his first command at age 12, and died in 1870 (age 69) still on active duty. His father was Hispanic. Farragut’s victories at New Orleans and Mobile Bay were termed at the time as the greatest achievements in the history of the U.S. Navy, and both altered the Civil War’s course. His cry “Damn the torpedoes!” at Mobile Bay is today a part of the American lexicon.

The illustration at top is Louis Prang’s depiction of the Battle of Mobile Bay.

Share your opinion in the comments below.



From Champion Hill

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Champion Hill Landmark Monument

In honor of the Civil War Trust’s announcement that it has preserved more land at the Champion Hill battlefield, site of the largest battle of the Vicksburg campaign.

I took this photo at Champion Hill on Tuesday, May 26, 2015 at 9:55 a.m. during a road trip Dan Davis and my daughter, Stephanie, and I took. (Here’s the story.)

On their website, the Trust has additional photos from the battlefield and a map of the area they recently preserved, as well as one of their groovy battle maps.


Gen. Isaac F. Quinby: A Math Professor Goes to War

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Brig. Gen. Isaac F. Quinby

It is no secret that I spend a lot of time in the 19th century. The Victorians are endlessly fascinating and the Civil War was a defining, if incredibly destructive, moment in our history. The cast of characters in that fratricidal war also furnishes a study in character. Besides Lincoln, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman has been one of my research interests.

It was within the ranks of Sherman’s army that I found an interesting local connection – Gen. Isaac F. Quinby. A West Point graduate and veteran of the Mexican War, Quinby was a professor of mathematics at the University of Rochester when the war began. Born near Morristown, New Jersey, in January 1821, the reticent professor looked much like his close friend Sam Grant (Ulysses).

After graduating from the Point, Quinby served as an assistant professor of natural philosophy there, high above the Hudson River.  After resigning his commission, the young teacher moved to Rochester to take up work with the University.  Nearby in Genesee County, Quinby had relatives which eased his transition to his new home.

At the outbreak of war, Quinby was quick to volunteer his services and raised a regiment of infantry – the 13th New York Volunteers.  Mustered in in May 1861, the so call “Rochester regiment” signed up for a 90 day tour of duty, Colonel Isaac Quinby commanding.

The boys from Upstate New York quickly began their association with Gen. “Uncle Billy” Sherman, serving in his brigade at the Battle of First Manassas (Bull Run).  Like much of the army, the sting of defeat after being routed on the plains of Manassas led to low morale and desertions.  Col. Quinby too suffered similar symptoms.  After a disagreement with Gen. Winfield Scott, commander of all Union armies, Quinby resigned and returned to Rochester.

In late March 1862, General Grant lured him away from the University with a commission as a brigadier general and placed him in command of the District of Mississippi, which was within Grant’s military department.  Soon Gen. Quinby was intimately involved in Grant’s effort to capture Vicksburg, Mississippi – thereby reopening the great river to Union commerce.  In September, Quinby was transferred from administrative duty to line command of the Seventh Division, Army of the Tennessee.

The Vicksburg Campaign was an exercise in frustration and patience for all involved.  Bogged down in various schemes to bypass the “Gibraltar of the West,” many soldiers and officers suffered from illness and exposure.  The big killers were dysentery and malaria.  Quinby too suffered from recurring bouts of malaria.  Finally, after many failed efforts to take or bypass Vicksburg, Grant evolved a plan to cross the river below the city and come at it from behind.  The former professor was an important part of the plan and led his troops with distinction at the Battles of Champion’s Hill and the Big Black, before taking part in the first assault on Vicksburg itself.

Vicksburg was surrendered to Gen. Grant July 4th, 1863 – just one day after Union Gen. George Meade had defeated Gen. Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg.  Although Gen. Quinby was doubtless pleased with the great Union victory, his health continued to decline.  Quinby was assigned light duty while he attempted to recover his health.  As part of this effort, the general was ordered to Elmira, NY, where he took over command of the Draft Rendezvous Camp.  Quinby served in Elmira from July until December 1863, when he was forced to resign his commission.  Not wanting to lose his friend’s talents completely, Grant helped to secure Quinby’s appointment as Provost Marshall of the 28th Congressional District – a post he could hold simultaneously with his duties at the University of Rochester.

After the war, Quinby was appointed United States Marshall for the Northern District, a post he held until 1877.  From that time he served as a surveyor for the City of Rochester and served as a Trustee of the Soldier’s Home in Bath, NY.  This last was a source of great pride to the general, who was elected Vice President of the board in 1879 and served until shortly before his death.

General Isaac F. Quinby died September 18, 1891, in Rochester, N. Y, at the age of seventy-one.  Unfortunately, his final illness was a painful one, according to his West Point obituary.  He suffered from a combination of “pleurisy, dropsy, and an affection of the brain.”  He was survived by his wife of forty-three years, Elizabeth (nee Gardner), and eight of his twelve children.  He is buried in Hope Cemetery in Rochester.

Quinby’s grave at Mount Hope Cemetery in Rochester, NY

 

 


Into the Volcano with the Ironclad CSS Arkansas

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Vicksburg

Part I of this tale left the lonely Arkansas and Captain Isaac N. Brown on July 15, 1862, facing a gauntlet of Yankee deep-water warships, steam rams, river ironclads, gunboats, and bomb vessels as he ran down the Mississippi toward Vicksburg. It was the combined squadrons of Flag Officers David G. Farragut and Charles H. Davis assembled to reduce this last major Confederate stronghold on the river.

Brown was bringing his powerful vessel to the defense of the city. He had started that morning from his base up the Yazoo River and had been engaged in a running battle ever since with Union river ironclad Carondelet, wooden gunboat Tyler, and ram Queen of the West, which had been dispatched upriver on reconnaissance just as Brown was coming down.

Carondelet now lay crippled and helpless in the mud of the Yazoo while Tyler and Queen of the West fled badly wounded before the Rebel monster seeking the safety of their fleet. Arkansas herself had been bloodied and battered in the fight; her engines were faltering; her gun crews and engineers were fighting exhaustion, heat, and fumes from the riddled smokestack.

Isaac Brown

Captain Isaac Brown

Peering downriver from the top of the casemate, Brown recalled: “The genius of havoc could not have offered a finer view, the panoramic effect of which was intensified by the city of men spread out with innumerable [U.S. Army] tents opposite on the right bank.”[i]

They were not yet in sight of the city while in every direction except astern their eyes rested on foes. His only advantage was surprise; the Yankees were caught with their pants down and most of them could not get steam up and underway. But they could get off shots from many powerful guns as Arkansas blew by.

Several rams came at him. “Shrapnel shot were coming on our shield deck, twelve pounds at a time.” Brown climbed down the ladder to the gundeck to see how his Missouri backwoodsmen handled their 100-pounder Columbiads. “At this moment I had the most lively realization of having steamed into a real volcano, the Arkansas from its center firing rapidly to every point of the circumference, without the fear of hitting a friend or missing an enemy.”

He observed the two aft six-inch rifles “blow off the feeble attack of a ram on our stern.” Another ram crossed ahead. “Go through him!” Brown ordered the pilot. A shot from one of the bow guns pierced the enemy’s boiler. “His steam went into the air, and his crew into the river…. We passed by and through the brave fellows struggling in the water under a shower of missiles intended for us. It was a little hot this morning all around; the enemy’s shot frequently found weak places in our armor, and their shrapnel and minie-balls also came through our port-holes.” It was 120° in the casemate and hotter in the engine room.

Arkansas on MississippiMost Union shots bounced off, but one shell penetrated armor plus twenty inches of wood backing and exploded, obliterating four men and knocking another ten down.

Two other rounds burst near or came through gun ports, killing eight and wounding three in a single gun crew. Holes in the smokestack filled the gundeck with choking fumes, forcing the men to crowd around gun ports for air.

When the flag staff was shot away, Midshipman Dabney Scales (a Virginian and future officer on the CSS Shenandoah) scrambled up the ladder under ferocious fire and replaced the flag. He would have done it a second time but was ordered by Captain Brown not to expose himself again.

Brown himself sought cooler air back on top of the casemate. He saw a large ironclad dead ahead and broadside to. He ordered the pilot to strike her amidships, but the Yankee was too quick. Arkansas steamed by, delivering a broadside, “which probably went through him from rudder to prow.” That was the last volley delivered or received. They were passed, “the outer rim of the volcano.”

Brown called his officers topside to see what they had just come through and get some fresh air. “The little group of heroes closed around me with their friendly words of congratulation.” Just then a heavy rifle shot passed close over their heads as the “parting salutation.” Two feet lower and it would have been disastrous.

Arkansas continued downriver without further trouble. “We were received at Vicksburg with enthusiastic cheers,” wrote Brown, as the battered ironclad backed into the wharf below the city. Her smokestack was cut to pieces with sixty-eight shot holes; a section of plating was torn from the side. Exultant locals greeted a crew dazed, power-blackened, and streaked with blood and sweat.

“Blood and brains bespattered everything,” noted one observer, “whilst arms, legs, and several headless trunks were strewn about.”[ii] Citizens and soldiers crowded eagerly aboard, but a passing look was sufficient as they hastily retreated from the sickening spectacle.

Brown landed his dead and wounded—“terribly torn by cannon-shot”—and began immediate repairs, refueling, and recruitment. Half the crew was lost either as casualties or men who had volunteered only for the trip to the city. That night, Farragut ran his squadron back downstream concentrating all firepower on the stationary Arkansas—to no effect—while Vicksburg gunners concentrated on him.

Scales

Dabney Scales

A week later, Arkansas still lay secured to the bank with many officers and crewmen ashore sick and wounded when an enraged Farragut sent the ironclad USS Essex and ram Queen of the West to destroy her. At 4 o’clock in the morning, Midshipman Scales was awakened by call to quarters and hurried to his station.

The enemy bore down on them, smoke belching from stacks, propeller and paddle wheels thrashing brown water. The few weary Confederates aboard could not heave the anchor up or get underway. They could hardly man three guns, wrote Scales in a letter to his father, “So we had to lay in to the bank, and couldn’t meet him on anything like equal terms.”

Essex ranged alongside and poured in a broadside at twenty feet, “which crashed against our sides like nothing that I have ever heard before….”  His men were burnt by powder from the flashing muzzles. Then Queen of the West surged forward trying to ram a hole at Arkansas’s waterline. Just before Queen hit, the Confederates threw their helm over while engaging the starboard propeller, turning their ship just enough for the ram to glance off and run aground astern.[iii]

Arkansas continued to refit while sortieing occasionally to frighten her foes. Farragut made several attempts to hit her with mortars, again with no results. By the end of July, the Federal navy conceded that they could not take Vicksburg from the river no matter how many ships and guns they brought to bear. Farragut—never comfortable with his deep-water squadron in the middle of a continent regardless the size of the river—withdrew back to the Gulf of Mexico while Davis moved his river forces north to regroup.

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Destruction of CSS Arkansas

General Earl Van Dorn, commanding Confederate forces in the city, regarded Arkansas as a super weapon. Her repairs were incomplete, her officers not fully recovered, most of the crew untrained. Nevertheless, Van Dorn ordered the floating fortress downriver to support an attempt to recapture Baton Rouge from the Yankees. But as Arkansas came within sight of the town with her temperamental power plant failing and under murderous fire from Union gunboats, the tired ironclad had to be abandoned and blown up to prevent capture. It was August 6, 1862.

The CSS Arkansas leaves an underappreciated legacy in the shadow of her more famous sister, the CSS Virginia/Merrimack. The achievements of Captain Isaac Brown and his men in building, equipping, arming, and finally operating Arkansas under appalling conditions and against overwhelming odds are remarkable.

She was the only Confederate casemate ironclad to operate, much less win significant victory, on the Mississippi River; she generated panic among Northerners far and wide. A case can be made that Arkansas was the most formidable and most successful of all Rebel ironclads. After her loss, there would be no significant Confederate navy presence on Western waters.

[i] Isaac N. Brown, “The Confederate Gun-Boat ‘Arkansas’,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Being for The Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers. Based Upon “The Century War Series.” Edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, of the Editorial Staff of “The Century Magazine”, 4 vols. (New York, 1884-1888), vol. 3, 572-575. Ibid. for all Brown quotes in this article.

[ii] Chester G. Hearn, Naval Battles of the Civil War (San Diego, 2000), 130.

[iii] Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865 (Washington, 1971), 2:86.


Turning Point: Assault on Battery Wagner by the 54th Massachusetts

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Around a small hamlet in southern Pennsylvania, Robert E. Lee’s vaunted Army of Northern Virginia was stymied and driven back after three days, July 1st through the 3rd, of bloodletting at the Battle of Gettysburg.

A turning point in the Civil War in retrospect.

On July 4, 1863, the Confederate bastion of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the “Gibraltar of the Mississippi River” capitulated to Union forces under General Ulysses S. Grant.

A turning point in the Civil War in hindsight.

The evacuation of Tullahoma on the first day of July and the surrender of the last Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River at Port Hudson, Louisiana on July 9, 1863, are two other significant actions in July.

Both can be considered turning points when studied through the lens of history.

Yet, there was a much more significant engagement, this time a Union defeat, that also turned the tide of the American Civil War. This assault took place on July 18, 1863 on Battery Wagner, part of the defenses of Charleston, South Carolina. In the waning moments of daylight, the 54th Massachusetts charged determinedly toward the sandy approaches and abates that was Battery Wagner. Their assault failed with the loss of their commander, Colonel Robert Gould Shaw. In this example though, the heroism of the charge, the courage that these soldiers portrayed, and what their actions meant advanced the Union war effort.  

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Battery Wagner, photo taken in 1865 (courtesy of 28thga.org)

The 54th Massachusetts Regiment was an African-American or in 19th century parlance, “colored regiment.” The brainchild of Massachusetts Governor John Andrews, the African-American soldiers that comprised this unit was fighting for their race, to thwart the misconceptions that blacks could only serve in labor and non-fighting positions, and to overthrow the Southern slave oligarchy and institute universal freedom.

Battery Wagner would be the pivot in which African-American soldiers showed their fighting prowess and their ability, like their fellow white soldiers, to uphold the standards of the American military. After the failed assault on July 18, 1963, the repercussions reverberated around the country. Including in the Confederacy.

“The negroes fought gallantly, and were headed by as brave a Colonel as ever lived,” wrote Lieutenant Iredell Jones of the 1st South Carolina about the 54th Massachusetts attack. Even the Charleston Courier’s editor grudgingly admitted that the African-American soldiers showed “bravery” although he wished it was “worthy of a better cause.”

In the North, descriptions such as “heroic conduct” from the Boston Transcript or “fought with the desperation of tigers” as the Cincinnati Daily Gazette wrote to their readership depicted the accounting of the 54th Massachusetts’ assault.

“The experiment has begun” wrote a newspaper reporter for the Washington Reporter a Pennsylvania-based publication. With the news of Battery Wagner, the 54th Massachusetts were “magnificent for their steadiness, impetuosity, and dauntless courage.” As a fitting epitaph, the reporter wrote that if all Union troops, irrespective of color of skin showed “as single hearted as these soldiers, our difficulties would disappear.

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Currier & Ives Lithograph of the 54th Massachusetts charge on Battery Wagner (Courtesy of the Library of Congress

There were skeptics from the beginning of the “experiment” to arm and equip colored regiments and the fighting on July 18, 1863 did not completely dispel them. “Not myself a believer in the arming of negroes, free or contraband, as soldiers, I must do this regiment the credit of fighting bravely and well.” Other newspapers of the more Democratic Party persuasion, while still hesitant to embrace African-American soldier policy, admitted that the 54th Massachusetts and their bravery and courage under fire, made them “entitled to assert their rights to manhood,” and showed their “undaunted courage” and that they were “evidently made of good stuff.”To conclude the importance of the assault in July, an editor of the Chicago Tribune summed up the cause of African-American soldiers serving the Union war cause by writing;

                    “[The] government and the people have woke up to the importance of negro                              soldiers in the conduct of the war…[the] thing is now settled–the negroes will                          fight.”

The impact and fallout of the assault was noticed in the highest circles of the Federal government. The judge advocate general, Joseph Holt, in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in August 1863, attested to;

                     “The tenacious and brilliant valor displayed by troops of this race has
sufficiently demonstrated to the President and to the country the character of
the service for which they are capable.”

Horace Greeley echoed the sentiment of how important that first test of combat was for the role and advancement of African-American soldiers in the war effort. Writing in 1865, he looked back on that summer two years prior, “It is not too much to say that if this Massachusetts Fifty-fourth had faltered when its trial came, two hundred thousand colored troops for whom it was a pioneer would have been put into the field.”

The eyes of the nation, from the president to the common citizen were on the black soldiers that courageously advanced in the surf and turf along the South Carolina barrier islands. If these men would have faltered, balked on the advance, let fear of death and destruction deter them, the cause of African-Americans would have been severely hampered.  Not only did they go in with gusto, but one of their number was awarded the Medal of Honor, for bringing the national flag back out of the conflict, never letting it touch the ground.

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Medal of Honor winner William Harvey Carney of the 54th Massachusetts. He won the medal for his actions at Battery Wagner on July 18, 186

Before the end of the war over 179,000 African-American soldiers would don Union blue uniforms and help defeat the Confederacy and permanently end the “peculiar institution” of slavery and bondage. This number would constitute approximately 10% of the entire United States Army. Furthermore, another 19,000 African-Americans would serve in the United States Navy during the conflict. Over 40,000 would succumb to wounds or disease in defense of the Union and for the cause of freedom and liberty. In addition to aiding the Union war effort, the removal of African-American manpower affected the Confederate war effort, depriving them of manual labor; both in the military arena and on the home-front.

When one discusses the momentous month of July 1863 and the turning points of the American Civil War, the legacy of the 54th Massachusetts’s assault on Battery Wagner and what that created, must be part of the discussion. This batch of occurrences in the summer of 1863 turned the tide of the conflict and put the North on the footing to win the American Civil War.

 

*For an excellent study which was consulted as part of the research for this post, please consult, “Thunder at the Gates, The Black Civil War Regiments That Redeemed America” by Douglas R. Egerton*

 

 

 

The Mississippi River Squadron and the “Great Artery of America” (Part 2)

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Emerging Civil War welcomes back guest author Kristen M. Pawlak

Part 1 can be found here.

As the first of the major naval battles to secure the Mississippi River from 1862 until 1863, Fort Henry also marked a turning point in the strategic use of the Western Gunboat Flotilla. It was now a respected and powerful force the Union Army was able to use in the destruction of Confederate fortifications and strongholds along major rivers in the West. At Fort Donelson, just a week following the surrender of Fort Henry, Foote’s gunboats pounded the Confederate fortifications, but after holding their fire until the gunboats were in range, the Rebel guns opened up and forced the fleet to retreat. Though Foote’s attack against Fort Donelson failed, Grant’s Army of the Tennessee surrounded the garrison and forced the Confederates to surrender. In addition, the Confederate garrison at New Madrid, Missouri and Island No. 10 fell within weeks after Foote’s Flotilla bombarded them and transported thousands of Federal infantrymen past the Rebel defenses. On April 25, New Orleans surrendered to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron under the command of David Farragut, and later to Major General Benjamin Butler, which then opened the Mississippi River from the south.

Less than two months after the fall of Island No. 10, the Flotilla now under the command of Charles H. Davis – which included the Ram Fleet and Mississippi Marine Brigade — took Fort Pillow and Memphis within two hours on June 6, 1862, after delivering a crushing blow to the Confederate River Defense Fleet. Created and commanded by Col. Charles Ellet, the Ram Fleet consisted of specialized steam-powered towboats with reinforced hulls used to ram enemy ships. Ellet’s son Charles Rivers Ellet transferred from the Army as an assistant surgeon to join his father’s naval unit. He would later command the Ram Fleet’s USS Queen of the West after Col. Ellet’s mortal wounding during the Battle of Memphis. As a part of the Ram Fleet, the 350-man Mississippi Marine Brigade, commanded by Col. Ellet’s younger brother Alfred Ellet, consisted of soldiers that served as marines, artillery, and cavalry.

An artist’s rendition of the “Total Annihilation of the Rebel Fleet” during the battle of Memphis. (Photo courtesy of the United States Navy)

On June 6, 1862, the Union naval force approached Memphis, where the Confederate River Defense Fleet protected the forts there. Just days before, the Union Armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Mississippi forced the withdrawal of the Confederates from the town; this, in turn, effectively cut Confederate-occupied Memphis off from the east. The Rebel garrison fled to Vicksburg and other vulnerable Confederate strongholds. However, the River Defense Fleet was unable to acquire the necessary coal to flee before the Mississippi River Squadron arrived. Nonetheless, the River Defense Fleet chose to fight the Federal fleet. According to Western Gunboat Flotilla commander Charles Henry Davis, the fight began when “the rebels . . . opened fire.” A combination of gunfire and ramming, “compelled the remaining [Rebel] vessels to resort to their superiority in speed as the only means of safety.”[1] Ultimately, the fleeing River Defense Fleet traveled between 5 and 10 miles downstream, “until all of the rebel fleet were either sunk or captured,” with the exception of the General Van Dorn that escaped.[2] In less than two hours, the city of Memphis fell into Union hands as one of the victories of the Mississippi River Squadron. The Commander of the USS Carondelet Henry Walke believed that the “chief of all results of the work of the flotilla was the opening of the Mississippi River once and for all from Cairo to Memphis, and the complete possession of Western Tennessee by Union forces.”[3]

Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Mississippi River Squadron. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

The victory at Memphis also solidified the decision by the army to transfer command of the Western Gunboat Flotilla to the navy. On October 1, 1862, the navy renamed it “the Mississippi River Squadron,” and Admiral David D. Porter assumed command. In the official War Department orders, the navy credited the “brilliant and important service of the gunboats” as the main reason for the transfer. They also considered the flotilla’s success on the Mississippi River as “one of the brightest pages in the history of the war for the preservation of the integrity of the country and the suppression of a causeless and wicked rebellion.”[4] In October 1862, the only two Rebel garrisons left on the Mississippi River were positioned at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Mississippi. To secure both of these bastions, “will be a severe blow [to the enemy], and, if done effectually, will be of great advantage to us, and probably the most decisive act of the war.”[5]

From December 1862 until March 1863, Grant and the Army of the Tennessee made several failed attempts to take Vicksburg. These included Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s frontal assault at Chickasaw Bayou and Grant’s expeditions to construct artificial waterways through the bayous bypassing Confederate batteries defending the city. To finally achieve success and force the surrender of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton’s garrison there, Grant devised a combined-operational strategy between his ground troops and the gunboats. Using intelligence gathered by Porter’s Mississippi River Squadron, Grant finalized a plan to take Vicksburg: “I will go below Vicksburg and cross over if I can depend on you for a sufficient naval force. I will prepare some transports … and we’ll start as soon as you are ready.”[6]

The Army of the Tennessee would advance south from Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana along the western side of the Mississippi to New Carthage, where the army would cross into Mississippi south of Vicksburg. In the meantime, on April 16, the Mississippi River Squadron was ordered to run the batteries at Vicksburg to bring vital supplies and transport vessels to Grant’s army positioned near Grand Gulf. In the cover of the late-night darkness, the squadron embarked with engines muffled, lights off, and protected with cotton bales, “to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of our design.”[7]

Admiral Porter described the scene after the war in his Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War, “as I looked back at the long line I could compare them only to so many phantom vessels. Not a light was to be seen nor a sound heard throughout the fleet.”[8] As the fleet approached Vicksburg, large fires around the Confederate defenses illuminated the river to spot approaching Federal gunboats. Rebel batteries opened up on the now-visible fleet. Confederate infantry lined the levees along the river and fired their muskets just twenty yards away. Fortunately for the Mississippi River Squadron, only two transport ships were lost and several sailors wounded or killed. “The Vicksburgers must have been disappointed when they saw us get by their batteries with so little damage,” Porter later boasted.[9] The squadron’s incredible feat to bypass Vicksburg opened the door to victory: “General Grant had turned the enemy’s flank with his army, I had turned it with the gun-boats; now Grant had to cross the river and trust to his brave soldiers.”[10]

An etching of the Mississippi River Squadron’s fabled run past the defenses of Vicksburg on April 16, 1863. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia)

The army was to cross at Grand Gulf, guarded by Rebel Fort Wade and Fort Coburn.. To establish a beachhead, Porter’s fleet was again called to bombard and neutralize the enemy fortifications. In the morning of April 29, 1863, seven of Porter’s ironclads opened fire on both forts.[11] After “five hours and thirty-five minutes,” they silenced the guns of Fort Wade, but not Fort Coburn, which was out of the range of fire for the ironclads’ guns.[12] Additionally, Porter cited the “strong current . . . and strong eddies” as “the most difficult portion of the river in which to manage an ironclad.”[13] The failure to take Coburn forced Grant to slightly change his plans for the crossing. The army was to cross just south of Grand Gulf at Bruinsburg.

The next morning, the first part of Grant’s army boarded Porter’s transports at Disharoon’s Plantation and embarked across the river to Bruinsburg. With Confederate troops alert at Grand Gulf, the main challenge was to cross the river unseen by the enemy. Covered by darknesslike the first run past Vicksburg’s defenses, “the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully . . . by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, iron-clads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them.”[14] On May 1, thanks to the Mississippi River Squadron, Grant’s force crossed the mighty Mississippi. Without the Mississippi River Squadron, the army’s crossing of the Mississippi would have been tremendously difficult, if not, impossible.

From May 1 through May 17, Grant pushed deeper into Mississippi, inflicting heavy casualties on Rebel defenders at Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, Big Black River Bridge, and in the defenses at Vicksburg. On May 19 and 22, Grant launched several frontal assaults to dismantle the Confederates and seize their strongholds, but ultimately failed. According to Grant, “the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that [a siege of Vicksburg] was best.”[15] The Federal lines outside Vicksburg were built with entrenchments, rifle pits, batteries, and parapets reinforced with logs. Grant had no siege guns, but instead relied upon Porter’s naval guns from his fleet to blast the Confederate fortifications. “Our men are much used up, but we will bombard all we can,” Porter wrote to Grant from the USS Black Hawk.[16] Until July 3, the Mississippi River Squadron continued the bombardment with unrelenting ferocity. Recalling the siege in a poem entitled, “The Siege of Vicksburg,” Porter wrote, “And the fleet lends its cannon to add to the din . . . but the fires burned down, leaving Vicksburg in gloom, And the phantom-ships floated on — sealing her doom.”[17]

On July 4, 1863, Pemberton finally surrendered his approximately 30,000-man Army of Mississippi after two months of siege, starvation, death, and destruction. In the days prior, the Rebel commander had discussed terms of surrender for his defeated army with Grant, who insisted upon an unconditional surrender and the parole of all Confederate forces at Vicksburg. Pemberton finally agreed on the evening of July 3 and formally surrendered the next day. On July 9, 1863, less than one week after the fall of the “Gibraltar of the Confederacy,” the final Confederate fortification on the Mississippi River at Port Hudson fell to Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks. The decisive victories for the North on the Mississippi caused a relieved President Abraham Lincoln to declare, “the Father of Waters goes unvexed to the sea.” The Mississippi River was finally back in Union hands.

The historiography of the Vicksburg Campaign tends to focus on Ulysses Grant’s leadership and his strategic brilliance in seizing the garrison at Vicksburg. Over the course of time unfortunately, the history books  have not thoroughly discussed or analyzed the naval contribution to securing the Mississippi River and capturing Vicksburg.

For Grant, the hero of Vicksburg, the Mississippi River Squadron won the campaign for the North. Immediately after the surrender, Grant rode from his headquarters to the river to personally thank and congratulate Porter and his sailors for their invaluable service during the campaign.[18] “The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance, the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged . . . The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service,” Grant later wrote in his Memoirs.[19] Additionally, this same navy was vital in defending and protecting Union interests on Western waters, especially in controlling waterways and suppressing enemy smuggling and irregular warfare. It can be said, the Mississippi River Squadron not only saved the rivers, it saved the West and, therefore, the United States.

Kristen M. Pawlak is the Development Associate for Stewardship at the Civil War Trust. She also sits on the Board of Directors at the Missouri Civil War Museum, and actively volunteers with the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation. She graduated from Gettysburg College in 2014 with a BA in History and Civil War Era Studies, and is currently pursuing her MA in Nonprofit Leadership and Management at Webster University. From St. Louis, Kristen has a fond interest in the Civil War in Missouri, Civil War medicine, and the war experiences of soldiers.

Sources:

[1] Charles Henry Davis, “Detailed Report of Flag-Officer Davis,” June 6, 1862, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series1, vol. 23, 119, 120.

[2] “Report of Commander Walke,” June 6, 1862, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series1, vol. 23, 122.

[3] Henry Walke, “The Western Flotilla at Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow and Memphis,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, v. 1: 452.

[4] “General Orders No. 150,” October 2, 1862, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series1, vol. 23, 389.

[5] W.T. Sherman to F. Steele, George W. Morgan, A.J. Smith, and M.L. Smith, December 23, 1862, in William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 287.

[6] Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes, 174.

[7] Ibid., 175.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 177.

[10] Ibid., 178.

[11] David D. Porter, “Detailed Report of Acting Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy,” April 29, 1863, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series 1, vol. 24, 611.

[12]Ibid., 610.

[13] Ibid., 611.

[14] Grant, Memoirs, 477.

[15] Ibid., 532.

[16] David D. Porter, “Letter from Acting Rear-Admiral Porter to Major-General Grant,” May 22, 1863, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series 1, vol. 25, 30.

[17] Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes, 198.

[18] “Vicksburg Campaign: Unvexing the Father of Waters,” Civil War Trust, accessed December 18, 2017, https://www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/vicksburg-campaign-unvexing-father-waters.

[19] Grant, Memoirs, 574.

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